

VIA: _____
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DISPATCH NO. EQQA-62869

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INFO: Bonn
POB

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 24 MAY 1974

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CART

SPECIFIC— Visit to the Sicherungsgruppe Chief

Ref: EQQA-59119

1. In accordance with the plan stated in reference, Easby paid a visit on 18 April to Dr. Ernst BRUECKNER, chief of the Sicherungsgruppe in his offices at Joachimstr 15 in Bonn. This coincided with an invitation received from Paul DICKOPF, acting president of the Bundeskriminalamt, to participate in a meeting with Dr. BRUECKNER to discuss the problem of deteriorating relations between the Sicherungsgruppe and the BfV, and their views as to how this situation might be solved.

2. DICKOPF and Reg. Rat fm NIGGEMEIER were in Bonn on other business and were to reach the SG offices at 5 o'clock for the discussion. As it happened they were almost 3 hours late, which provided an excellent opportunity for a long talk with BRUECKNER. A great part of this time was spent in discussing the Friedrich Wilhelm HEINZ case, and an outline of this talk is reconstructed from notes made after the meeting in Attachment A. Other subjects covered were briefly:

a. BRUECKNER confessed his contact with OCA was not as close as he would like it. He pointed out that for political reasons, much as he would like to be able to do so, he was not free to visit OCA offices himself. Easby replied that he planned to visit BRUECKNER at least once a month to discuss specific cases as well as to answer any outstanding queries which had accumulated from the SG in the meantime. BRUECKNER welcomed this suggestion with what appeared to be genuine enthusiasm. Our workbook system, which had been explained to him during our previous meeting in February, was again explained to him and he was urged to take advantage of it in the form of queries to by phone, or if he preferred in particular cases via DICKOPF's offices and we would endeavor to give them rapid service. It was also explained to him that these workbooks in order to retain their value and substance required a continuous flow of new material. He indicated that he would be happy to know our requirements. It did not seem politic to pursue this subject immediately on the comparatively short acquaintance we have had with BRUECKNER as the weekly CARAVEL reports show, but this is obviously a source which is only partially exploited. BRUECKNER also commented that the visits of Tom Hughes have diminished in frequency, to his regret. (Comment: Although we cannot possibly eliminate the CIC contact here, this seems an excellent opportunity to forge our own relationship to BRUECKNER closer.)

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both agree.

4. This of the ~~same~~ case inevitably lead to discussion of other incidents in and around the Black office, which in turn lead to the lack of clarity surrounding a number of its performers, notably CHAMBERLAIN. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out the relative youth of this man, and his almost complete lack of preparation for the job he was holding, and almost no one in saying that CHAMBERLAIN had his father's counterespionage talent today to thank for his present position. He conceded -- and this he agreed with an opinion expressed by one of the more capable field officers -- that this officer, being the very symbol of the disagreement between the coalition and opposition parties, is and has been the lightning bolt used to focus the immediate objective of both internal and external disruption efforts. During personnel, command and political talks to Moscow Germany on the part of a great number of government officials cannot help but provide the instruments which the Soviets and coalition can use to exploit chinks in the German armor represented by such controversial bodies as the Black office. Although he cannot be described as totally discreet, Dr. CHAMBERLAIN did not go so far as to describe the Black office as a sort of subversives but he made no bones about the fact that the Black intelligence service had suffered a series of such blows that it could hardly be said to survive. In his opinion, it should not survive. He pointed to the numerous political party (at home, the "League" of the Fatherland, the NSDAP's attempts at cross border operations and the German organization which he said were making the German intelligence service a perfect fool. He was convinced this state cannot continue after such a way, and said in his own view the entire intelligence effort should be placed under one coordinating head if a man qualified to perform the coordination could be found. Without making it even like a prepared speech, he cited CHAMBERLAIN as the only man with sufficient ability or prestige in the Federal Republic to undertake such an effort. He expressed the feeling that Germany is too small to support both a military and civilian external intelligence service and the conviction that the two should be combined. Here will be said later on his views on internal security matters.

5. In speaking of shadow figures on the German scene, it was mentioned that the real source of the Radio reports had not yet been brought to light and that to date still be in possession of a significant number in to German political and military planning. This led to a theoretical discussion of the possible part our operation of late Republic remnants. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out there was one man in Germany who had greater knowledge on this subject than probably any other. This man is undoubtedly the former head of the German intelligence service, who was charged with the investigation of the handling of the German intelligence service in the hands of the Soviet Union. This man had been shot, but preparing a 30 page report on the subject on his

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exhaustive interrogation of ROEDER and numerous other persons only to have the report suppressed by his superiors who ordered all copies destroyed. Apparently the report was so derogatory to ROEDER's judicial handling of the case that had it been published and the indicated action taken against ROEDER, the whole investigation could well have been considered to have been inspired by Soviet sympathizers. Nevertheless, in the process of preparing this report FINCK had amassed, according to BRUECKNER, an unparalleled knowledge of the workings of the Rote Kapelle apparatus. BRUECKNER does not believe any Allied office has ever been in touch with FINCK who managed to retain one copy of the report which BRUECKNER had read. (Comment: BRUECKNER made this disclosure in a fashion quite obviously designed to provoke extreme interest on our part. It was not clear whether he was actually implying that he could be persuaded to act as the channel for obtaining this report once again or wanted to discover how actively we were engaged in trying to turn over old Rote Kapelle stones. In any case, [] merely wrote down FINCK's name and left the subject. It would be interesting to know whether the FINCK episode is known to either Hq or POB and whether anyone American, German or British in the intelligence world is known to have seen his report.)

d. BRUECKNER confirmed the statement previously made by the Bonn base that the Waldemar HOFF is not interested in the BfV position unless it is raised to a B4 (Ministerial-direktor), the highest civil service rank. He had heard that the SPD favored the nomination of Herrn BEHRMANN, a former Land minister of Interior official, for the job. No further details were known to him.

3. About 2030 DICKOFF and NIGGEMEIER arrived from the Ministry where they had been closeted with various officials on their budgetary and personnel problems. The discussion thereafter revolved around the problem of coordination -- or rather lack of it -- between the BfV and the SG. Unfortunately BRUECKNER is not outstanding for his objectivity, and spent more time condemning the situation and the reasons for its existence than he did suggesting ways to correct it. The following are the main points made during the discussion:

a. BRUECKNER claims the BfV sends no information to the SG other than that contained in cases which at the direction of the Oberbundesanwalt or the Ministry of Interior are turned over to the SG for executive action. Even here, the BfV does not pass on all information, but frequently leaves the SG in the dark on many important details. He harked back to the old favorite cases of Elli KIDENHAIN, "Vulkan", and the Düsseldorf KPD raids. Significantly enough he cited no more recent examples.

b. The BfV automatically (sic) receives any intelligence by-product of purely criminal cases. Asked where this takes place, BRUECKNER replied that the regulations of the Laender make it obligatory on the LKA's to pass such information automatically to the LfV's who then passed it on to the BfV. It seemed useless to point out that the LKA/LfV and LfV/BfV relations varied from Land to Land and that even if this process were to function as BRUECKNER described it, it was no credit to the SG. When asked if cases which came to

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the SG from sources other than the LfV's or BfV were reported to the BfV, BRUECKNER replied there were few of these, but they were not so passed.

c. Turning to the attack again, BRUECKNER described the jurisdictional squabble between SG and BfV as the indication of the latter's thirst for power and proclivity to empire building. He would not concede that the problem could in any way be attributed to growing pains, but did allow that lack of clear cut jurisdictional pronouncements from above and the absence of a central responsible figure or coordinator of intelligence had much to do with it. DICKOPF and NIGGEMIER were much more charitable in this point, but supported BRUECKNER in his statements of the need for a central figure, a man of format, to weave the elusive threads of the intelligence skein into a comprehensible pattern. BRUECKNER declared that in the absence of legislative changes, the only way to effect proper coordination was for the Ministry of Interior to appoint as chief of the BfV a man who has the will to cooperate and is quick enough to recognize and stifle obstructionism on the part of his subordinates (the name of Dr. Quentner NOLLAU was mentioned as one of the chief practitioners of this art).

d. [] explained that the increased tasks to be heaped on the German security agencies by the demands of the emigration program, new NATO commitments, industrial and governmental security programs and the like had given rise to concern on the part of the Allies lest the German agencies were not fully equipped in personnel - or experience-wise to carry out the new responsibilities. [] then cited the letter which the Allies had recently directed to Dr. GLOEKE. BRUECKNER felt such a letter would be passed by GLOEKE to Minister of Interior SCHROEDER who in turn would pass it on to one of his department chiefs where it would either die or give rise to an evasive and tendentious reply. He felt that despite the letter the feeling of independence enjoyed by the Laender under the new federalist system was such that for political reasons it was unlikely such centralization could be expected to take place. DICKOPF saw slightly rosier prospects however if the NATO theme continued to be stressed from all sides, since the newest partners in the NATO alliance could scarcely afford to refuse to tighten up their security organization through any means practicable. All stated their belief that the only lasting solution to this problem was a revision of the basic law (Grundgesetz) reorganizing the internal security structure of the Fedrep, which in turn would have to be agreed to by the Laender representatives in parliament.

e. Reiterating the complaint that has been heard so often before, they lamented practically in chorus that within the Ministry itself there is no one in a position of responsibility who is an expert either in police or intelligence matters, with the exception of Ministerialrat Dr. FUCHS, who is no longer in Referat VI A e. Staatssekretar Ritter von LIX was described as a federalist and therefore basically opposed to any centralization, and Ministerialdirektor Dr. MOHR was dubbed incapable -- furthermore his departure for his new position in Berlin was now certain. They complained further

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that the working level experts - namely themselves - are not consulted in any planning sessions concerning the limits or nature of their functions.

f. The Bundeskriminalamt has evolved a plan begun many months ago for splitting up the intelligence and internal security pie, on which we have some basic information. The principle point is that it revives the concept of a political police with specific duties and relationships to the other public security organs: the military intelligence service, the Federal prosecutor, the political intelligence service and the criminal police. (A full interim report will be forthcoming on this subject in the near future. DICKOPF and BRUECKNER are now revising their plan for presentation to the Ministry.) Discussions on this topic are scheduled for the immediate future in Wiesbaden, and [] has been asked to attend in order that he may interpret the plan to the U.S. authorities.

[] []

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19 May 1955
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- Attachment A to EGQA--62869

24 May 1955

HEINZ Case

The following is reconstructed from notes made after the conversations with Dr. BRUECKNER on 18 April. Dates are missing and many details are hazy. BRUECKNER has promised to try and supply written material on what has gone on.

1. The Blank office had an application for the Luftwaffe from a man 'X' who had been an aviator during the war, when he had dropped German agents behind Soviet lines. After he was captured, he allegedly performed the same service for ODOPAL behind German lines. The Blank office made his employment conditional on his willingness to show what he could do in the intelligence line. Since at the time of his application 'X' was a free lance journalist, he was sent to Berlin to see what he could scrape together on the facts behind HEINZ' visit to the Soviets.

2. 'X' went to East Berlin where at an FDJ rally he met a DDR press officer and told him he was collecting information for an article on Friedrich Wilhelm HEINZ. Quite unaccountably the DDR press man stated that FrI. THIEDE was the key to this story. He thinly hinted that THIEDE worked for the East, but was basically an unstable individual and if pressed could be made to talk. He also revealed to 'X' that HEINZ had made a previous trip to Karlshorst in September 1954. Emboldened by the press referent's willingness to discuss this subject, 'X' asked if there was not some file material to which he might have access. The press referent conceded that a file did exist which could be seen at a later date.

3. 'X' returned and reported to the Blank office, who became more than casually interested in this report and pressed the man to return for a look at the file. At a subsequent meeting the press referent said he could not lend the file to 'X' but would allow him to read it, including reports allegedly written by HEINZ himself. When 'X' returned from this meeting, he called his Blank office contact by his real name, which he claimed to have learned from the press referent, who had also allegedly given him the real names and pseudonyms of a number of other Blank office agent handlers. The Blank office and the SG were astounded at this information which they believed could only have reached the opposition through HEINZ himself. Determined to have 'X' get a look at the mysterious file, they sent him back a couple of more times to meet his friend the press referent. According to BRUECKNER, Alois EDER, now under arrest on suspicion of having committed espionage, was told by the RIS in Urfahr that HEINZ had returned to West Berlin on 16 Dec. This same information reached the SG from one RESCHKE or KESCHKE, fnu, who alleged to have had it from Friedrich KAUL, the notorious Communist lawyer. The SG found this hard to swallow, knowing that the attempt to entice Frau HEINZ to the east did not begin until 17 Dec. Reasoning that the RIS would scarcely have released an unwilling HEINZ the day before launching their operation to lay hands on his wife, the SG asked to have 'X' clarify this point with the press officer. The latter simply stated this was caused by an error of "another office". The last two meetings (dates not stated), were held in SFS offices and negotiations were allegedly being made to show 'X' the file in Switzerland. At this point the Blank office saw fit to call off the operation

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since they felt their man was compromised and was only being led into a trap. It was apparently the location of the last two meetings which finally brought them to this conclusion.

4. At this point, BRUECKNER admits, in view of the statement of 'X' that HEINZ had been in Karlshorst in September 54 and the information about the pseudonyms of Blank office case officers, he (BRUECKNER) urged the Oberbundesanwalt to issue a warrant of arrest for HEINZ and Frl. THIEDE, fearing that HEINZ might decide after all to throw in his lot with the RIS. The brother of Jakob KOLB who had allegedly visited Jakob in East Berlin told the authorities that Jakob claims HEINZ came willingly to meet the RIS. When questioned, Frl THIEDE proved to be anything but timid under interrogation. She admitted that HEINZ had spent a few days with her in September 54 and that he had been absent from her one night although she denied knowledge of where he had been. On this point, HEINZ himself, who is rather notorious for his flirtations, claimed he had spent that particular night with another woman. Otherwise, HEINZ stuck strictly to his original story and could not be swayed from it. Therefore, he was released from custody within a few days. BRUECKNER admitted HEINZ had not been asked to repeat his feat of physical prowess in sliding down clothes lines and scaling 2 meter high fences, but thought it would have been a good idea.

(Comment: We have expressed to BRUECKNER our extreme interest in the HEINZ case and have asked for copies of any reports he can give us. Obviously the story of 'X' requires a good deal of fleshing out before any of the alleged facts can be evaluated. On the face of it, it appears like a strictly shoe string operation if not RIS controlled from the beginning. On the other hand, if THIEDE is working with the RIS or Sfs and if HEINZ' story of his reluctance via a vis the Soviets is true, THIEDE's remarks about Sept 54 and the mosaic pieces from such widely separated sources as KAUL and EDER would seem to be part of a fairly transparent pattern to cause great misgivings in Fedrep security circles on the question of HEINZ' bona fides. Indeed this is precisely what has happened. If BRUECKNER reneges on providing us written information, we will discuss the case again from the beginning in as great detail as possible at the next meeting with him.)